November 25, 2024

Original Sin: Guilty but not Condemned?

 

Hello and welcome. In this article, we'll analyze and critique a particular conclusion within the original sin perspective of the fall and its consequences. To look at all of our articles about original sin, see here



OVERVIEW OF VIEWS WITHIN THE ORIGINAL SIN PERSPECTIVE

 


When it comes to perspectives on the fall and its consequences, the main distinct premise of original sin that is not shared by other perspectives like ancestral sin is that all humans from conception are held personally guilty in God's sight for Adam's sin. As McFarland summarizes:


“Stated summarily, the Western (or Augustinian) doctrines of the fall and original sin affirm (1) that Adam and Eve’s violation of God’s primordial commandment against eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (Gen. 2:16 – 17; 3:6) caused a fundamental deformation in humanity’s relationship to God, each other, and the rest of creation; and (2) that this “fall”includes among its consequences that all human beings thereafter are born into a state of estrangement from God –an “original” sin that condemns all individuals prior to and apart from their committing any “actual ”sins in time and space. - McFarland, In Adam’s Fall, p. 29-30 


With this in mind, we must ask what conclusions are formed from this premise. 


1. Classical Original Sin View 

- All humans from conception are held guilty in God's sight for Adam's sin. Babies must be baptized to remit the inherited guilt from Adam otherwise they’re damned to hell if they die.

The classical view is the most historically prevalent view of original sin, clearly articulated between the late 4th century AD and the Middle Ages. Our article here demonstrates this with historical sources. In the modern day, it is affirmed by some Roman Catholics and any other group or person who is committed to the historical Augustinian view of original sin. 


2. Limbo View 

- All humans from conception are held personally guilty in God's sight for Adam's sin. Unbaptized babies are not damned if they die, but they aren’t necessarily saved either. They go to a 3rd place for eternity that’s in between called limbo. Opinions on precise details vary. 

The limbo view is largely seen as a development in thought from the classical view, which gained prominence in the late medieval period. In the modern day, it is mostly affirmed by some Roman Catholics but is not dogma. 

 

3. Covenant Household View 

- All humans from conception are held personally guilty in God's sight for Adam's sin. But the children of believers are spared from being damned to hell if they die. However, the children of unbelievers are damned if they die because they’re guilty of Adam’s sins. 

The covenant household view became prominent during the Protestant Reformation. In the modern day, this view is primarily affirmed among some Reformed groups but is by no means a dominant view.

 

4. Guilty but not Condemned View

- All humans from conception are held personally guilty in God's sight for Adam's sin. But this doesn’t condemn anyone if they die. All infants who die go to heaven. 

The guilty but not condemned view has become prominent and widely articulated within the original sin perspective since the late 19th century. This article will focus on our critique of this view. 



CRITIQUING THE GUILTY BUT NOT CONDEMNED VIEW 



Inconsistency and Tension - 

Historically speaking, original sin has said that infants are guilty, so they are condemned if they die. Ancestral sin, which is our perspective, says infants aren’t guilty, so they aren’t condemned if they die. This view attempts to combine the premise of original sin with the conclusion of ancestral sin. One problem with this view of guilty but not condemned is that it establishes clear inconsistencies with God's justice. We will frame the issue with multiple propositions. 

P1: From God's judicial perspective, if a human dies while possessing guilt, they will not be saved. They will be condemned. 

P2: It pleases God to impute Adam's guilt with the wrath and spiritual deadness that come along with it to all humans from conception. In light of P1, God knows full well that due to his justice, those who die while possessing this guilt will not be saved. They will be condemned. 

P3: It also pleases God to not condemn infants. If an infant dies, God remits this guilt from them to prevent them from being condemned and instead saves them. 

The problem with the above propositions is that an affirmation of 1 and 2 is inconsistent with 3. If it pleases God to impute sin to infants, knowing that in light of his justice, dying with sin imputed to you is grounds for condemnation, it follows that God is pleased for deceased infants to be condemned. Proposition 3 does not logically follow from this. 

If God sees newly conceived babies as under his wrath and spiritually dead due to possessing Adam's guilt, and it pleases him to impute this guilt, why wouldn’t he follow through with what this logically entails upon their death? Why would the cessation of their embodied existence suddenly trigger a change in God’s attitude toward them, to where they’re no longer under his wrath and spiritually condemned? If God knows that possessing guilt and his wrath cause damnation upon bodily death, and this is how he views infants, why would God then not follow through with this and not damn any infants? 

Would it not make more sense if infant salvation is insisted upon, to just say that spiritual condemnation, wrath, and guilt are not how God sees infants in the first place? If possessing guilt makes you spiritually condemned and under wrath, and dying in such a state would damn someone, then it logically follows that God would not impute this to infants in the first place if he desires to not damn infants. 


Redefining Guilt? - 

One concern we have from the guilty but not condemned view is a potential redefining of what it means to possess Adamic guilt to conclude with more ease that deceased infants aren't damned. This is not to say that all who hold the view redefine, but it's a concern that needs to be addressed. This would be one way of getting around the tension we mentioned above. 

Reformation confessions and documents that affirm original sin, such as the Augsburg Confession, the Belgic Confession, the Formula of Concord, the Synod of Dort, and the Westminster Confession, collectively define the punishment and penalty of possessing original sin as including eternal damnation. To see a multitude of sources on this, read our article here. If this is what's meant by being guilty of Adam's sin, we believe the inconsistency and tension remain. However, there are a couple of ways this guilt could be redefined. 

1. Possessing Adamic guilt could be redefined to mean that we are all mortal and physically die. In this case, the guilt does not inherently reflect or inform the spiritual condition of infants because it's framed as having physical impacts. With this definition of Adamic guilt, eternal damnation would not be an inherent entailment as part of the penalty. 

2. Another potential redefinition is to say that possessing Adamic guilt just broadly means we are under various consequences of the fall, like being removed from the garden, being mortal, living in a fallen world, and inevitably sinning ourselves to the exclusion of a penalty of eternal damnation. With this definition, one could be guilty but not condemned. 

These are the two main redefinitions we know of, but there may be others that are similar. The problems with these definitions of guilt are: 1. This is not how the doctrine of original sin has historically or confessionally been understood as the meaning of possessing Adamic guilt. 2. These new definitions essentially collapse the guilty but not condemned view into the ancestral sin perspective on the fall, but with sloppy and imprecise language. How is that? It's because the key denial of ancestral sin is the possession of Adamic guilt (as historically and confessionally understood); and because these redefinitions of guilt remove the historical and confessional understanding of what it means to possess Adamic guilt, they also deny the possession of Adamic guilt (as historically and confessionally understood). As a result, there is no meaningful difference between the view of guilty but not condemned + redefinition and ancestral sin, given that they both affirm the same uncontested and uncontroversial points about the fall. In this case, we are no longer truly dealing with a view of original sin. 


Detached from History - 

Moving forward, let's grant and assume that the guilty but not condemned is not redefining what it means to possess Adamic guilt. Even so, we must point out to those who care about historical continuity that this view is still at odds with the historical articulations of original sin. We've written extensively about the doctrine of original sin and its historical affirmation of infant damnation both here and here. In the 5th century, affirmers of original sin, such as Augustine of Hippo, condemned the idea that deceased infants could be saved apart from baptism, which they believed was the only way to remit Adam's guilt. Otherwise, the deceased infants were certainly damned. Augustine said any ideas to the contrary are deceitful and condemn the universal church. So the guilty but not condemned view of original sin is actually condemned by the very earliest figures who most strongly promoted the doctrine. 



A Potential Solution - 

The clearest solution to the issues we addressed above seems to be a passively inherited guilt through Traducianism rather than an active imputation from God. 

Traducianism of the soul asserts that the human soul is transmitted through procreation and natural generation along with the body. Both the material and immaterial aspects of humans are derived from either one or both of the parents. 

Creationism of the soul asserts that God creates a soul for each body when conceived/generated. 

The benefit of Traducianism is that it removes God as an active agent involved in the creation of each person. If God is passive or not involved, rather than active in the creation of souls, one could extrapolate this to also say that God is passive or not involved in Adam's guilt being accounted to us. It could be argued that this guilt is passively inherited or transmitted through procreation, much like genes and other features. As a result, some tension could be relieved between God actively imputing guilt to infants, knowing it would damn them, but simultaneously not desiring any infants to be damned. The relief would come in the form of this guilt not being so much of an imputed legal verdict to infants, but a substance passively inherited in which God didn't have an active part. God would be more reactionary to the transmission of guilt in this view, rather than making an active judgment of imputation. While this doesn't alleviate all tension or solve all problems, it would soften things between the inconsistency of simultaneously affirming P2 and P3, which we covered earlier.

“In his final, incomplete work to Julian of Eclanum, he insists that every soul (and not only every body) was contained in Adam when he sinned: this is the only way Augustine believes that his doctrine of inherited guilt can be sustained.” - A History of Mind and Body in Late Antiquity, p. 223

“Throughout his life Augustine vacillated between these two options and set the terms of the debate for later Catholic and Protestant traditions. Traducianism offers a plausible mechanism for the transmission of original sin but raises worries about materialism (especially Tertullian’s version). Conversely, creationism implies that God is responsible for souls being born sinful or that souls become sinful by coming into contact with the body—either God is responsible for original sin or the body causes original sin.” - Madueme, Original Sin and the Fall: 5 Views, p. 30  

In fact, scholarship has noted that in its historical context, Traducianism was seen by Augustine as the most consistent, if not the only way to maintain the doctrine of original sin. In light of this, it's no surprise that Traducianism would be the clearest solution to the problems within the guilty but not condemned view of original sin. 

The problem is that Traducianism has issues of its own. We've dedicated an entire article to unpacking the soul's origin and historical significance of the issue which you can read here. In that article, we cover: 

- Over eighty verses and passages of the Bible to determine what the correct understanding is of the soul's origin. 

- W.G.T. Shedd is cited over twenty times to understand and interact with his arguments for Traducianism. 

- How the origin of the soul is related to Christology and other problems with Traducianism. 

In the end, we concluded that the Biblical data best supports the Soul Creationism view of the soul's origin. If Traducianism solves the issues of the guilty but not condemned view of original sin, it must itself be proven true first. We should avoid affirming entire doctrines as a means to an end of solving other problems in our theology. 



CONCLUSION



In this article, we have offered some pushback and criticism to the guilty but not condemned view of original sin, which tries to maintain that all humans from conception are held personally guilty in God's sight for Adam's sin. But this doesn’t condemn anyone if they die, and all infants who die go to heaven. There is certainly more discussion to be had on the issue. In this article, we granted the premises and conclusions and then observed if the view was internally consistent. The bulk of our criticism is 1. Internal inconsistency with God's actions. 2. Potential redefining of guilt. 3. Departure from how original sin has been historically understood. 4. The most obvious solution to the inconsistencies is problematic as well.  

Some of what makes discussing this issue tough is that our view of ancestral sin is comprised of an ancient set of beliefs, which are, in a historical context, an alternative view to the Augustinian original sin view. Because of this historical framing, modern discussions on the issue are often complicated precisely because most affirmers of original sin have departed from the doctrine as historically understood and instead often affirm something close to the guilty but not condemned view. The goalposts of what ancestral sin was framed as an alternative to have shifted, and the logical lines of thought and their conclusions have blurred. As a result, this complicates the dialogue when conclusions are shared but premises are disputed. 

In our view, if someone desires to hold on to the salvation of deceased infants and deny that any are damned, the simplest explanation is to just side with ancestral sin and say that God doesn't see infants as guilty and deserving of damnation in the first place. Instead, condemnable guilt is grounded on personal sins. As we noted earlier, there is a potential temptation of the guilty but not condemned view to unknowingly collapse into ancestral sin. Of the original sin views, this view is certainly the closest to ancestral sin. We aren't persuaded that it's scripturally, logically, or historically consistent to cling to both an inherited Adamic guilt as well as universal deceased infant salvation. One of the two must either go entirely or be modified to where the guilt is no longer guilt in the original sin sense, or infant salvation is limited to the baptized, children of believers, or some other criteria. 



Thanks for reading. That concludes this article. 


4 comments:

  1. None of the positions you’ve outlined accurately reflect the biblical doctrine of sin and grace. Scripture clearly teaches, through the Apostle Paul, that guilt is imputed to humanity through Adam’s disobedience just as righteousness is imputed to believers through Christ’s obedience (Romans 5:12–19; 1 Corinthians 15:21–22). The only consistent alternative to this double imputation would be to say that guilt comes only from personal sin and righteousness only from personal obedience. But that view directly contradicts the gospel itself, for if righteousness comes by personal obedience, then Christ died for nothing (Galatians 2:21).

    Regarding the destiny of those who die in infancy, Scripture does not speak dogmatically about each individual case, but it does affirm both (1) their participation in Adam’s guilt, and (2) God’s sovereign freedom to extend saving grace to whomever He wills. Infants are in need of the same grace as all humanity, and God is able to apply the redemptive work of Christ to them apart from conscious faith if He so chooses. We have biblical precedent for this in John the Baptist, who was “filled with the Holy Spirit, even from his mother’s womb” (Luke 1:15). This shows that God can regenerate and sanctify an infant apart from personal understanding or volitional faith.

    Therefore, the “guilty but not condemned” position with my caveat is neither logically inconsistent nor historically unfaithful—it is the only view that preserves Paul’s doctrine of imputation, the universality of grace to all who receive it, and the sovereignty of God in salvation. Infants who die may indeed be saved, not because they are innocent or without Adamic guilt, but because the mercy of God in Christ can reach even the womb.

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    1. Hey Adam, thanks for engaging. A few thoughts:

      "None of the positions you’ve outlined accurately reflect the biblical doctrine of sin and grace."

      If by this you mean the four views I initially outlined from the perspective that Adam's guilt is inherited/imputed, I'm not sure how. I'd need further insight on that to understand your issue. If you study the various conclusions people come to from the premise of inherited Adamic guilt, these are the main categories you will find. In the 21st century, the main views you'll see are the guilty but not condemned view or the limbo view.

      I have separate articles that engage with Romans 5 and 1 Corinthians 15; to avoid repeating myself unnecessarily, I'd recommend checking those out. However, I'll briefly say that 1 Corinthians 15:21-22 is an improper prooftext for how imputation of guilt and righteousness operates. Contextually, Paul is talking about physical mortality and immortality in that section of verses. Read before and after these verses to understand this more fully.

      Now, on your point about the only consistent alternatives. My view is that, as the general rule, guilt does come from personal sins, and righteousness comes through faith. I don't see how this contradicts the gospel. In fact, it seems to align with it. We are dead in our own sins according to Paul, before conversion, and it's through transgressing the law that the world becomes guilty. People are said to be ultimately condemned to hell because of their own sins they have committed in their own bodies. So guilt is grounded on personal sins. However, we are told over and over again that righteousness is through faith rather than works, and this faith precedes being counted as righteous in God's sight. See Romans 3:21-22, 9:30-32, Philippians 3:9 for three examples.

      Regarding your points on the destiny of infants: I of course disagree with your first point. Unless by "participating in Adam's guilt" you are lumping in consequences of the fall which do not have a 1:1 correlation with an individual's spiritual/legal standing in God's sight (which is the whole point of contention), like physical mortality, pain, etc. On the second point, there's more agreement. God is free to choose how His economy of salvation operates and infants need grace and redemption from what the fall brought upon all humans. Infants cannot save themselves through any meritorious works.

      However, I think you're missing the tension and problems I brought up. God being able to regenerate infants apart from personal faith does not solve the issues I mentioned or answer the questions I posed. It's whether God's action in this is consistent with prior actions He performed. Reread my section on inconsistency and tension. In my opinion, my view is much more consistent when it comes to God's actions leading up to and in saving infants.

      For your last paragraph, none of this follows in my opinion.




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  2. Thanks for the thoughtful reply — I appreciate the dialogue. A few points of clarification and correction may help us move the discussion forward.

    1. The Nature of Imputation in Romans 5 and 1 Corinthians 15

    You suggest that 1 Cor 15:21–22 refers merely to physical mortality, not to judicial imputation. But the parallelism Paul establishes between Adam and Christ in both 1 Cor 15 and Rom 5 involves federal headship—two representatives whose actions are legally and covenantally counted to those they represent. Limiting “death” to biological mortality evacuates Paul’s Adam/Christ typology of its meaning. The life believers receive in Christ is resurrection unto glory and justification (Rom 5:18; 8:10–11), not mere resuscitation. Thus, Paul’s argument presupposes both physical and judicial realities bound together in covenant representation.

    2. The False Dichotomy Between Personal and Imputed Guilt

    You write that “guilt comes from personal sins and righteousness comes through faith.” Yet Scripture teaches that both guilt and righteousness can be imputed apart from our personal acts. Just as Adam’s disobedience is counted to his posterity (Rom 5:18–19), so Christ’s obedience is counted to believers. To deny the former while affirming the latter is inconsistent: the same grammatical and theological structure underlies both. The gospel itself depends on the principle of imputation—God counting what is not ours as ours.

    3. On Divine Consistency and Infant Salvation

    You claim that divine regeneration of infants “does not solve the tension.” But that conclusion assumes what must be proved—that God’s act of imputing guilt necessarily entails condemnation without the possibility of grace applied to the infant. Scripture shows otherwise: God’s justice and mercy operate together under His sovereignty (Rom 9:15). Imputation establishes our need for grace; it does not limit God’s freedom to apply redemption. The very purpose of election and grace is to demonstrate that salvation rests not on human condition or capacity, but on God’s mercy alone. Thus, God’s regenerating an infant is not inconsistent—it is a perfect expression of the same sovereign grace that saves any sinner.

    4. On Historical Consistency

    Appealing to Augustine or medieval formulations as normative overlooks the Reformation’s corrective principle that Scripture, not ecclesial tradition, is the final authority. The “guilty but not condemned” position with the caveat of divine grace in Christ preserves the historical insight of Adamic headship while submitting its conclusions to biblical revelation about God’s mercy and freedom. Continuity with history is valuable, but it must never override the authority of inspired Scripture.

    5. Clarifying the Meaning of “Guilt”

    Much of our disagreement hinges on what “guilt” entails. Biblically, guilt is a forensic reality—a legal standing before God’s law—not merely the experience of mortality or corruption. Thus, infants share Adamic guilt in the sense of covenant representation, not in personal culpability. But because the same covenantal structure allows Christ’s righteousness to be imputed apart from personal obedience, God can justly apply that righteousness to whomever He wills, even to infants. The consistency of God’s character is preserved precisely by recognizing both truths simultaneously: guilt through Adam, grace through Christ.

    Conclusion

    Your critique ultimately redefines imputation and assumes a mechanical uniformity in divine justice that Scripture itself denies. The “guilty but not condemned” view, rightly understood, upholds Paul’s double imputation, magnifies divine mercy, and maintains logical and biblical coherence. It allows God to remain just—the Judge who condemns sin—and the Justifier of those, even infants, to whom He graciously applies Christ’s righteousness.

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  3. Happy Sunday, Adam!

    So for Romans 5 and 1 Corinthians 15, I don't believe they're talking about the same aspects of the typological comparison between Adam and Jesus. I think that's quite clear from the context. When it comes to the benefits that have their ultimate root origin in Christ, Romans 5 seems to convey that they are legal/moral/spiritual in nature. But in 1 Corinthians 15, it's extremely clear that Paul is talking about physical mortality and immortality originating from two sources.

    I agree with you that physical mortality/immortality isn't the only thing there is between what has its ultimate origin from Adam and from Jesus. So we are in agreement there. In my comment earlier, I was specifically commenting on what seemed to be an appeal to 1 Corinthians 15 for the imputed guilt of Adam's sin. Which, upon study, isn't what Paul is talking about in that passage. It's not a passage addressing how the conditions, economy, and causes of imputation operate. There are over a dozen references to bodily resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15. That's the subject matter of the passage. Paul begins by appealing to the death and resurrection of Jesus as the foundation of the gospel. He then rebukes those who say there is no bodily resurrection of the dead. He then speaks about the order of bodily resurrection. Then he talks about the nature of the resurrected body. That's the context of that passage.

    On your third point, you said:

    "You claim that divine regeneration of infants “does not solve the tension.” But that conclusion assumes what must be proved—that God’s act of imputing guilt necessarily entails condemnation without the possibility of grace applied to the infant. Scripture shows otherwise:"

    I think you again misunderstood my points and aren't resolving the tension I mentioned. I affirm that God saves infants and doesn't desire to damn them to hell, like you seem to affirm. I don't think it's a necessary entailment that if God imputes guilt, there's no possibility of grace. That's not my point. If that were true, then nobody would be able to be saved. The question is of consistency in God's actions with what he desires.

    Perhaps an example would help illustrate what I'm getting at:

    You have a bomb that has a lit fuse. You know this bomb is dangerous and will kill anyone near it when it explodes. You also choose to give the bomb to a child. You also desire for the bomb to not harm the child. So right before the fuse reaches the end and explodes, you stop the bomb from going off and harming the child.

    In my view, if you desire for the bomb to not harm the child, the decision that seems most logically consistent with those desires is to just not give the bomb to the child in the first place, rather than giving it to them, knowing what it will do to them, and then retroactively taking it from them again before it actually harms them.

    Obviously, both of us believe God is free to orchestrate his economy of salvation. What I was working through here was the internal consistency of action and which seemed to flow more coherently. (Again, not a slam dunk or comprehensive argument one way or the other, this article here is extremely tertiary, just working through conclusions that are formed and analyzing their coherence with prior affirmed premises). More could be said here of course but I'll move on.

    So on your fourth point, it's a bit of a non-issue.

    I clearly say in the article: "Even so, we must point out to those who care about historical continuity that this view is still at odds with the historical articulations of original sin."

    And I'm out of space to say anything else lol. If you want to talk further you can email me. laymanbiblelounge@gmail.com unfortunately, I had to delete a lot of things I was going to say due to character limits

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